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I. INTRODUCTION AND PRIOR RESEARCH
Firms design compensation systems, and more broadly human resource systems, to attract and retain certain types of employees, and to give them incentive to provide the level and mix of services the firm prefers. Over the last 25 years, one response of U.S. manufacturing firms to increased competition has been to introduce new compensation policies that generally replace fixed hourly pay for production employees with variable compensation. Under the new compensation arrangements, some production workers are paid exclusively based on their individual input (e.g., number of hours worked), while others receive both pay based on input measures and also compensation based on their individual and/or group output. To explain this rich variety of compensation structures, we develop and test a parsimonious model of optimal production incentives.
We find considerable diversity in how the 1,780 U.S. manufacturing plants in our sample compensate their employees. Approximately one-half of all sample plants determine pay using only input performance measures while the remaining plants use a combination of input and output measures (Panel A of Table 1 ). Further, the latter group is divided approximately evenly between plants using exclusively individual-based output performance measures, plants using a combination of individual-based and group-based output performance measures, and plants using exclusively group-based output performance measures.
The theme of our paper is that a significant portion of the preceding diversity in production employees' compensation can be explained by the extent of employees' specific knowledge and the value created when employees share this knowledge. Here specific knowledge is information that pertains to production employees' decision-making but is very costly to communicate to management (Jensen and Meckling 1992) .
To address the role of specific knowledge and how it is shared in manufacturing environments, we extend Raith's one-agent two-task model (2008) by introducing a second agent and allowing each agent to have private information on the productivity of both individual and group tasks. The agents' observable and contractible efforts across two tasks, together with exogenous state uncertainty, determine the principal's total output. The agents can improve their group-task related knowledge by sharing their information, and when the principal uses output performance measures to determine the agents' pay, this gives the agents incentive to utilize their specific knowledge to benefit the principal. Although pay based on output performance measures is typically riskier than pay based on input performance measures, the cost of this additional risk may be offset by the potential gains from exploiting the agents' specific knowledge.
We first derive predictions from this model regarding the choice of output performance measures and the incentive weight placed on these performance measures as a function of the plant's technology and operating environment. We then test these predictions using data from a national survey of manufacturing plants. Our empirical tests are based on proxies for the plant's technology and operating environment, as well as controls for a variety of other plant characteristics.
Prior research has addressed the tradeoffs involved in rewarding agents based on input versus output performance measures, and the corresponding tradeoffs between using measures of individual versus group output. However, this work typically focuses on one of the two tradeoffs whereas our model incorporates both. Prendergast (2002) demonstrates when optimal contracts will shift from using less risky input measures to using riskier output measures in order to motivate agents to use their specific knowledge. Hence, the value of agents' private information can increase in more uncertain environments, and consequently delegation and output performance measures will be observed more frequently in higher risk environments.
Other prior research documents that it is common in modern production environments to reward production workers based on both individual outputs and on group outputs. For example, in their study of 249 firms in the automotive and computer industries, Ittner and Larcker (1995) find that although individual performance tends to outweigh team performance in determining compensation, the mean (median) ratio of team performance importance to individual performance importance was 0.797 (0.750). Further, Shaw and Schneier (1995) find that in Fortune 100 companies, rewards for individual performance remain important even when firms rely heavily upon teams.
Existing theory offers diverse explanations for the use of group-based output measures.
Agency literature on moral hazard (Holmstrom 1982; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994) establishes that group-based incentives can create valuable externalities, even when agents have limited decision-making discretion, because group-based output measures can provide additional contracting information beyond that provided by individual-based performance measures.
Consistent with this prediction, Bushman et al. (1995) find that the use of aggregate or group performance measures in business unit managers' compensation contracts is an increasing function of divisional interdependencies.
In contrast to these studies, we emphasize how specific knowledge and the value of sharing this knowledge play important roles in the choice between individual-based output and groupbased output measures. Prior literature demonstrates that when specific knowledge is dispersed across individuals, assigning decision-rights to a team of employees rather than to individual employees can improve the joint allocation of decision rights and specific knowledge (Wruck and Jensen 1994) . For example, Keating and Wruck (1993) report how the implementation of a TQM program at Sterling Chemicals succeeded because quality teams elicited the specialized knowledge of clerks, craftsmen and machine operators to overcome significant operational bottlenecks. Similarly, Sprinkle and Williamson (2004) describe how John Deere Corporation shifted from individual-based incentives to group-based incentives to encourage greater information sharing, cooperation and motivation among employees.
This study makes three contributions to the literature on management control systems and incentive system design. First, whereas previous studies have focused on the informativeness of performance measures (e.g., Murphy 2001; Bushman et al. 1995) and documented settings in which noisier signals will be weighted less heavily in incentive arrangements, we demonstrate that in other settings the optimal incentives based on firm outputs (noisier signal) become sharper when agents have specific knowledge about the state of the firm's production technology.
Second, we demonstrate how specific knowledge and knowledge sharing influence firms' choices between individual-based versus group-based incentives, an aspect of incentive design that previously has received less attention, and we do so in a model that simultaneously incorporates the choice between input and output performance measures. Finally, our sample of 1,780 plants spans all the two-digit manufacturing SIC codes, which gives our study greater generalizability than previous research that relies on either relatively small samples (e.g., Bushman et al. 1995) or results from a single industry (e.g., Ichniowski et al. 1997) .
Section II develops a two-agent model in which both agents take observable actions and have specific knowledge they can share. Section III develops testable hypotheses based on the model in section II, and describes our empirical tests. The results of our empirical tests are presented in section IV, and section V reports the results of several robustness tests. Finally, section VI presents a summary and conclusions.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Consider a manufacturing setting in which the principal employs two workers, each of whom allocates her total effort over two tasks -individual and group production. Worker i devotes Production: Total output Y is the sum of individual and group output,
Outputs Y i and Y G are either high (1) or low (0), as a function of the efforts (a i , a iG ) and related productivity parameters, θ i , θ G . In particular, the probability of high individual output
, and the probability of high group output (
Production technology: The productivities of the plant's individual and group production about the true productivity of the two tasks. We assume that workers cannot communicate their private productivity signals (specific knowledge) to the principal. The prior probability of high and low productivity is:
Specific knowledge and knowledge sharing: Following Raith (2008), we define the following information structure for each worker's individual production task:
where τ i , s i  {1, -1}. Parameter k [0, 1] represents the extent of workers' specific knowledge in a given plant. As k  0, an agent's specific knowledge becomes less informative, and the posterior equals the prior of ½. As k increases, the worker's specific knowledge becomes more informative about the plant's production technology. For k > 0, when τ i = s i (i.e., both are +1 or both are -1), indicating "correct" beliefs, the worker's posterior increases above ½ and the magnitude of the increase is proportional to the strength of the agent's specific knowledge (k).
When s i ≠ τ i (i.e., an agent's signal does not match the actual state), the worker's posterior is < ½, again in proportion to the strength of the worker's specific knowledge (k).
For the group task we assume that workers can costlessly pool their private signals (s iG , s jG ).
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The information structure with pooled signals follows the same general structure as that of the individual task:
reflects the value of knowledge sharing.
2
The assumptions above imply a joint probability of
for all combinations of the two signals (s iG , s jG ) and the following posterior probability: 
Performance Measurement: Output performance measures (y) are related to the corresponding actual outputs (Y) through a common noise term e [0, 1] . Specifically, the probability that
. Larger values of the common noise term "e" reflect greater measurement error. 5 Design Choices: Several design features of our model should be noted. First, to focus on specific knowledge and knowledge sharing, we assume that the principal has perfect information on each worker's total input (i.e., total effort (A i ) is perfectly observable) but not on measures of output. This assumption shifts the emphasis from the traditional moral hazard problem to a delegation problem in which workers have specific knowledge that is essential for productivity.
Second, the principal's ability to observe workers' total effort, but not the distribution of total effort across the individual and group tasks reflects, for example, the routine tracking of employees' total hours worked but not the time devoted to each task. 6 Finally, Raith (2008, 8-9) discusses how his analysis of compensation based on inputs versus outputs can be reinterpreted to compare the use of individual incentives, which are associated with lower uncertainty like inputs, versus group incentives, which are associated with greater uncertainty like outputs. We take a related but different approach by explicitly modeling both specific knowledge and information sharing as distinct characteristics of the firm's environment. This enables us to derive predictions that distinguish the effect of these two characteristics, particularly in our Proposition 3.
Time Line:
Optimal incentive contract: To solve for workers' optimal effort levels, we first provide the following expression for the expected value of individual performance measure i y conditional on (θ i , a i ):
Similarly, the expected value of y G (i.e., group performance) conditional on actions a iG and a jG , and the group productivity parameter G   [0, 1] , is: 
The first-order conditions on worker i's actions a i * and a iG * (individual and group tasks) become: 
. (7) Using the expected productivities (5) in equation (6) and substituting the resulting expression, together with equations (2) and (3) into the principal's ex-ante profit function (7) 
Model predictions
We first analyze the influence of k, the extent of manufacturing workers' specific knowledge, on the optimal incentive contract. More precisely, we derive the effect of k on the incentive weights that the plants place on input and output-based performance measures (all proofs are in the Appendix).
Proposition 1:
As the extent of workers' specific knowledge (k) increases, the optimal weight on the input performance measure decreases (∂β/∂k <0), and the optimal weights on both output performance measures increase (∂γ/∂k >0 and ∂γ G /∂k >0).
Proposition 1 parallels Raith's (2008) result that more specific knowledge calls for a greater weight on output performance measures ( and  G ). Therefore, even with perfect input performance measures, noisy output performance measures receive increasing weight because they induce workers to utilize their specific knowledge and thereby align workers' interests with that of the principal.
Next, we examine the effect of the value of knowledge sharing (ρ) on the optimal incentive weights placed on input and output performance measures. Larger values of ρ reflect environments in which workers who pool their private signals can make relatively more precise inferences concerning group productivity, G  .
Proposition 2:
As the value of knowledge sharing (ρ) increases, the weight on the input performance measure decreases (∂β/∂ρ <0), while the weights on both output performance measures increase (∂γ/∂ρ >0 and ∂γ G /∂ρ >0).
Proposition 2 establishes that as the value of knowledge sharing (ρ) increases, the optimal incentive weights will decrease on input measures and increase on output measures. The increase in the incentive weight on group-based output (γ G ) follows directly because an increase in ρ means that the workers are now pooling more diagnostic signals, which increases the expected productivity of effort on the group task. The result that the weight on individual output () should also increase is less direct. The shift in the optimal incentive mix towards more weight on the group-based output performance measures (γ G ) also reduces the input incentive weight (β).
However, because β is the incentive weight on effort on both the individual and group tasks (recall that the principal observes only total effort, not the components), reducing β also indirectly reduces the agent's incentive to work on the individual task. Therefore, the principal must increase the weight on the individual-based output performance measures to compensate for the reduced input incentive weight, β. Hence, an increase in the value of knowledge sharing (ρ) results not only in greater incentive weight on group-based output performance measures (γ G ), but also greater incentive weight on individual-based output performance measures (γ). This leads to the interesting question of the relative influence of the value of knowledge sharing (ρ) and the extent of workers' specific knowledge (k) on individual versus group-based output performance measures ( ,  G ), which we address next.
Proposition 3:
The relative weight placed on group versus individual-based output performance measures is decreasing in workers' specific knowledge (i.e.,
and increasing in the extent of the value of knowledge sharing (i.e., ∂(γ G -γ)/∂ρ > 0).
Proposition 3 characterizes the influence of the extent of specific knowledge (k) and the value of knowledge sharing (ρ) on the relative incentive weights placed on group ( G ) versus individual-based output performance measures (). The intuition behind Proposition 3 comes from the differential impact that increases in specific knowledge (k) and the value of knowledge sharing (ρ) have on the returns to working on the individual and the group tasks. In particular, while more specific knowledge (k) directly increases the returns to both the individual and the group tasks, the magnitude of the gain to an individual employee from working on the group-task is smaller because the gain is shared with all group members. Consequently, increases in the extent of workers' specific knowledge (k) shift the relative incentive weight from group-based output performance measures (γ G ) towards individual-based output performance measures ().
Further, while the increase in the incentive weight on group-based output performance measures (γ G ) due to an increase in the value of knowledge sharing (ρ) is a direct response to the increased productivity of the group task, the corresponding increase in the incentive weight on the individual-based performance measures () represents an indirect, smaller response as described earlier. Hence, increases in the value of knowledge sharing () shift the relative incentive weight from individual-based output performance measure () towards group-based output performance measure ( G ).
Finally, Proposition 4 establishes how the quality of the output performance measure (e) affects the relative weight placed on input versus output performance measures.
Proposition 4:
As the noise in the output performance measure (e) increases, the weight on the input performance measure increases (∂β/∂e >0) and the weights on both output performance measures decrease (∂γ/∂e <0 and ∂γ G /∂e <0).
The intuition for ∂β/∂e >0 is straightforward and similar to findings from traditional agency models. Noisier output performance measures are more costly and therefore lead to assigning more weight to input performance measures. As the variance (e) of the output performance measure increases, the link between effort and performance weakens, which reduces employees' incentives to exert effort. We next describe our data and empirical tests.
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL Sample Selection and Data Description
We obtain our data from the 4 [Insert Table 1 here]
Translating Model Implications to Empirical Tests
Our model makes predictions concerning the incentive weights placed on alternative performance measures. Our empirical tests would ideally be based on the corresponding incentive weights in employees' compensation contracts. Unfortunately, the survey asked whether the plant had adopted various categories of input performance measures, as well as individual-based and group-based output performance measures, but did not collect the corresponding incentive weights. As a result, we design our empirical analysis to estimate the relative likelihood that plants use various categories of performance measures rather than to estimate the specific incentive weights they assign to these performance measures.
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To express our model's predictions in terms of the relative likelihood of plants using different categories of performance measures, we assume that whatever plant characteristics make it optimal to assign greater incentive weight to a particular performance category also increase the relative likelihood that the plant will find it cost-beneficial to employ such measures.
For example, in environments in which employees have more extensive specific knowledge, Proposition 1 predicts that the firm will increase the incentive weights on output measures. Our assumption then implies that the greater is employees' specific knowledge, the more likely the plant will be to compensate production employees on output performance measures. H3: As the extent of specific knowledge increases, the likelihood of using exclusively groupbased (individual-based) output performance measures decreases (increases).
Conversely, as the value of knowledge sharing increases, the likelihood of using exclusively group-based (individual-based) output performance measures increases (decreases).
Finally, in a similar manner we develop Hypothesis 4:
H4: As the noise in output performance measures increases, the likelihood of using output performance measures decreases.
Construction of Dependent Variable
As discussed above, the nature of our data requires that we estimate the likelihood of plants employing various categories of performance measures. Further, we assume that all plants employ a set of individual-based input performance measures and no plants use group-based input performance measures. Therefore, we focus our empirical tests on whether plants have adopted individual-based output performance measures and/or group-based output performance measures. Survey respondents indicated whether their plant implemented the following forms of compensation for production workers (respondents could select multiple responses): pay for knowledge, pay for skills, profit sharing, gain sharing, rewards for team performance, rewards for individual performance, other, and no incentives. We classify plants as using output measures (OUTPUT=1) if they selected one or more of the following responses: gain sharing, rewards for team performance, rewards for individual performance. We further classify these plants as using group-based output measures (GROUP=1) if they indicated their plant used gain sharing or rewards for team performance, and we classify plants as using individual-based output measures if they indicated their plant used rewards for individual performance.
We treat responses of "pay for knowledge" and "pay for skills" as indicating that the plant uses input performance measures. For several reasons, we do not classify plants with a "profit sharing plan" as using an output performance measure. First, profit sharing plans generally create only a weak and deferred association between outcomes and production workers' compensation.
In fact, Blinder (1990) and Blasi (1990) document that the majority of company-wide profit sharing plans provide deferred compensation in order to achieve tax and pension planning advantages. Second, Welbourne and Gomez-Mejia (1995) argue that profit sharing plans are less effective than gain sharing plans in creating output-based incentives because production workers find it difficult to understand how their inputs translate into outputs. Finally, because profit sharing contributions are usually proportional to employees' income, they generate strong incentives only for more highly paid middle and upper management.
Explanatory Variables
We next describe our proxies for specific knowledge and knowledge sharing and their relation to prior literature. 
computer-aided design and manufacturing). His findings suggest that in this
period, the complexity of production workers' jobs also increased significantly. Similarly, Leigh and Gifford (1999) find that investments in production technology are positively associated with production workers' education level and hours of formal on-the-job training.
Based on the preceding evidence for the association between investments in new technology and employees' technical skills and capabilities, we use a survey item in which respondents categorize their plant as having either no implementation (NEW TECH=1), some implementation (NEW TECH=2), or extensive implementation (NEW TECH=3) of new process equipment/technologies as a proxy for the extent of specific knowledge in each plant.
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Value of knowledge sharing: To proxy for the value of knowledge sharing practices within each plant, we use an indicator that captures the percentage of the production workforce participating in empowered or self-directed teams (EMPOWERMENT). These studies provide general support for our use of EMPOWERMENT as a proxy for the value of knowledge sharing.
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Noise: We use the percentage of output that requires rework (i.e., 100% -first-pass quality yield rate) as a proxy for measurement noise, because we expect this measure to be positively associated with production process uncertainty. This uncertainty reflects the stochastic nature of scheduling, inventory and maintenance processes, resulting in noisy measures of production workers' performance. To reduce the influence of outliers, we use the fractional rank of this measure. Thus, plants with greater values of this proxy represent plants with noisier output performance measures.
In addition to our hypothesized variables, we also include several control variables that are potentially correlated with our hypothesized variables. We control for the influence of nonproduction tasks on production workers by including a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when production workers interact with customers, zero otherwise (CUST INT). Because a plant's process technology likely affects both the types of skills required from manufacturing workers and the types of rewards used in the plant, we include several measures to control for production process characteristics. We control for a plant's capital intensity by including a logarithmic transformation of the dollar value of shipments per plant employee (CAPITAL INTENSITY).
Further, following the classification by Hayes and Wheelwright (1984, 176-179) , we include dummy variables that capture whether a plant's production process has a high mix of products (MIX=1, 0 otherwise), produces a large volume of products (VOLUME=1, 0 otherwise), is continuous (CONTINUOUS=1, 0 otherwise) or is discrete (DISCRETE=1, 0 otherwise).
In addition, we control for the extent to which plant production workers are represented by a union (UNION), because prior research suggests that unions prefer uniform pay to pay based on individual performance. Further, because Henneman and Berkley (1999) suggest that a firm's size is associated with the use of formal appraisal systems, and Shah and Ward (2003) find that larger plants more often use innovative work practices, we control for plant size using a measure of the number of employees in each plant (SIZE).
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Prior research also suggests that organizations develop operational routines that change infrequently. In particular, Pil and MacDuffie (1996) suggest that the longer an organization has experience with these practices, the more difficult it is to replace older, inferior practices.
Therefore, we include an indicator that captures the number of years that the plant has operated (AGE). 16 Finally, we include 2-digit SIC indicator variables to control for industry effects. (1) of Table 2 . Consistent with our hypotheses we find that the proportion of plants that use output-based performance measures is positively associated with our proxies for specific knowledge (NEW TECH) and the value of knowledge sharing (EMPOWERMENT), and negatively associated with our proxy for measurement noise (NOISE) at p < 1% (one-tailed).
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Univariate Tests
Therefore, our univariate tests provide strong support for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4.
As explained earlier, to test Hypothesis 3 we restrict our sample to plants that use either exclusively individual-based or exclusively group-based output performance measures, and examine whether our proxies for specific knowledge (NEW TECH) and the value of knowledge sharing (EMPOWERMENT) are associated with the proportion of plants that use exclusively group-based (as opposed to exclusively individual-based) output performance measures.
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, column (2) of Table 2 shows that EMPOWERMENT is positively associated with the use of group-based performance measures. However, we find no significant association between NEW TECH and the use of group-based output performance measures.
Therefore, our univariate tests provide mixed results for Hypothesis 3.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Multivariate Tests
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 present the results of a multivariate logit regression that tests Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4. Consistent with our hypotheses, the coefficients on NEW TECH and EMPOWERMENT in column (1) are positive and significant at p < 1% (one-tailed), and the coefficient on NOISE is negative and significant at p < 5%. Moreover, in column (2) the magnitude of the marginal effects for our hypothesized variables suggests that they are of significant economic importance. In particular, the results in column (2) show that for a one unit increase in NEW TECH and EMPOWERMENT (e.g., increase from NEW TECH=1 to NEW TECH=2), the probability that a plant uses output measures increases by 7% and 6%, respectively. In summary, the results reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 are consistent with manufacturing plants using output performance measures to induce production workers to use and share their specific knowledge (NEW TECH and EMPOWERMENT), particularly when it is less costly to do so because measurement noise is low (NOISE).
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 present the results of testing Hypothesis 3. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the coefficient on NEW TECH in column (3) is negative and significant at p < 1%, and the coefficient on EMPOWERMENT is positive and significant at p < 1%. Moreover, the results in column (4) show that our hypothesized variables are of significant economic importance. In particular, a one unit increase in EMPOWERMENT (NEW TECH) increases (decreases) the probability that a plant uses group-based output measures by 9%. In addition, more capital intensive plants (CAPITAL INTENSITY), plants that produce a high volume of products (VOLUME), plants with a higher proportion of workers represented by unions (UNION) and younger plants (AGE) are more likely to use group-based output performance measures.
In summary, the results reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 are consistent with groupbased (as opposed to individual-based) output performance measures becoming more important when the value of knowledge sharing (EMPOWERMENT) is greater and when production workers possess less specific knowledge (NEW TECH).
[Insert Table 3 here]
V. ROBUSTNESS TESTS Including Profit-Sharing as a Group-Based Output Measure
First, to check the sensitivity of our results to excluding profit-sharing plans as a group-based output measure, we repeat our multivariate analysis after recoding plants offering profit-sharing plans as using group-based output performance measures. The results reported in column (1) of Table 4 confirm the earlier findings with respect to Hypotheses 1 and 2, but not Hypothesis 4. In particular, in column (1) the coefficients on NEW TECH and EMPOWERMENT remain positive and significant at p < 1%. However, although the estimated coefficient on measurement noise (NOISE) remains negative, it is not statistically significant. Therefore, our results with respect to how specific knowledge and the value of knowledge sharing influence performance measure choice are robust to the inclusion of profit sharing plans as a group-based output performance measure, but our results for measurement noise are not.
Alternative Contrast for Testing Hypothesis 3
The earlier test of Hypothesis 3 considered only plants that use either exclusively individualbased or exclusively group-based output performance measures, thereby excluding 261 plants that use both types of output measures. For this second robustness check, we include these 261 plants by contrasting plants using either exclusively group-based or group and individual-based output measures with plants using exclusively individual-based output measures. The results in column (3) of Table 4 show that consistent with the earlier findings, the coefficient on NEW TECH remains negative and significant at p < 5%, and the coefficient on EMPOWERMENT remains positive and significant at p < 1%. Therefore, the results with respect to Hypothesis 3 are robust to including plants that use both individual and group-based output performance measures.
Using LABOR TRAINING as an Alternative Proxy for Specific Knowledge
The survey collected data on the average annual hours of formal training received by each plant employee.
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Because such training is likely to increase production workers' specific knowledge, a measure of the extent of relevant training could potentially be an alternative proxy for specific knowledge. However, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1996) data suggests that much of manufacturing workers' formal training involves issues largely unrelated to specific knowledge (e.g., occupational safety training, communications and quality training). Because we do not have data on the specific nature of the training received by production workers, we use the number of training hours multiplied by the percentage of goods sold attributable to labor costs (LABOR TRAINING) as an alternative proxy for specific knowledge. To the extent that the percentage of costs of goods sold attributable to labor costs reflects production workers' skills, education and other characteristics related to specific knowledge, we expect total training hours weighted by this percentage to be a reasonable proxy for specific knowledge.
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Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 show the results of using LABOR TRAINING as a proxy for specific knowledge. Consistent with our earlier findings, the coefficient on LABOR TRAINING is positive and significant at p < 5% when we test Hypothesis 2 (column 4), and negative and significant at p < 5% when we test Hypothesis 3 (column 5). Our results for the value of knowledge sharing and measurement noise remain unchanged. Therefore, our results are robust to using training for skilled labor as an alternative proxy for specific knowledge.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We develop and test a parsimonious model relating specific knowledge, the value of knowledge sharing and measurement noise to manufacturing plants' performance measure choices. Our empirical results provide general support for the prediction that manufacturing plants are more likely to use output performance measures when production workers have greater specific knowledge (proxied by the implementation of new production equipment/technologies) or when it is more valuable to induce production workers to share their specific knowledge (proxied by the percentage of the production workforce participating in empowered or self-directed teams). In addition, consistent with traditional agency models, we find empirical support for our model's prediction that the use of output performance measures is negatively associated with measurement noise (proxied by the percentage of output that requires rework). Moreover, consistent with our model's prediction, we find that when plants use output performance measures, they are more likely to use exclusively group-based (as opposed to exclusively individual-based) output measures when the value of knowledge sharing is greater and when, production workers possess less specific knowledge.
Our study makes several contributions to the incentive design literature. First, previous empirical studies have predominantly focused on the informativeness of performance measures (e.g., Murphy 2001; Bushman et al. 1995) . Our study complements such previous empirical work by showing that, under certain conditions, even when input performance measures are less noisy than output performance measures, principals reward agents based on their output when agents possess sufficient specific knowledge. Second, we demonstrate how specific knowledge and the value of knowledge sharing influence firms' choices between individual-based and group-based incentives, an aspect of incentive design that previously has received less attention, and we do so in a model that simultaneously incorporates the choice between input and output performance measures. Finally, our sample of 1,780 plants spans all the two-digit manufacturing SIC codes, giving our results greater generality than previous research that relies on either relatively small samples (e.g., Bushman et al. 1995) or results from a single industry (e.g., Ichniowski et al. 1997 ).
Although we performed several robustness tests to corroborate our findings, the use of archival data collected by a third party makes our results subject to several important limitations.
First, the survey questions were not designed for our specific hypotheses, and therefore our proxies can only imperfectly capture the underlying constructs, particularly the extent of specific knowledge and the value of knowledge sharing. Second, data on the implementation of manufacturing practices is self-reported, which could potentially bias our findings.
APPENDIX Group Task Information Structure
Consider the following general form of the information structure, where the prior probability of high versus low productivity equals:
The parameter ρ captures the value of knowledge sharing between workers and ρ  [0, 1-k ]. The information structure can be expressed as:
Based on the information structure of p(s iG, s jG | G ) defined above, conditional probability of p( G | s iG, s jG ) can be expressed as :
Thus, when workers share their knowledge and receive conflicting signals (e.g., s iG = -1, s jG = 1) the corresponding posterior probability on the productivity parameter  G converges to the prior.
As the value of information sharing  approaches its maximum value of (1-k), workers can achieve perfect information on productivity by pooling their knowledge; i.e., when ρ →(1-k) we 
Derivation of Principal's Expected Profit Function
Substituting into the ex-ante expected profit function equation (7) in the main text for the expected performance measure from equations (2) and (3), the principal's expected profit function can be expressed as:
Next, substitute the expected productivities (5) back into (6) for the optimal actions and using the resulting expressions into (A1) and evaluate the expected value of (A1) 
The above leads to the following expression for the principal's ex-ante expected profit:
By taking the first order derivative of E with respect to the incentive weights: (,  and  G ) we arrive at the optimal incentive weights:
A necessary condition to ensure interior solution for positive incentive weight requires:
Assumption (A3) ensures the numerator of  G is positive. It also implies
hence  >0. Similarly, one can show (A3) implies  > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1:
To examine the effects of specific knowledge k on agents' incentive weights, we take the partial from the expressions in (A2) for the optimal incentive weights, we have:
Proof of Proposition 2:
From the expressions in (A2) for the optimal incentive weights, by taking the partial derivative of the incentive weights with respect to the parameter for the value of knowledge sharing ; assumption (A3) ensures we have: 
Proof of Proposition
The denominator of (A4) is positive because of (A3). Hence, the sign of ∂γ/∂e is determined by the sign of the numerator. Note (+k) ≤ 1 and k ≤ 1. Hence the numerator of (A4) For the purpose of this test we dichotomize our independent measures as follows: NEW TECH is Low if a plant has not implemented new process equipment / technologies, and is High if a plant has some or extensive implementation of new process equipment / technologies; EMPOWERMENT is Low if respondents indicate that 0% of the production workforce participates in empowered or self-directed teams, and is High if they indicated that 1-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, 76-99%, or 100% of the production workforce participates in empowered or self-directed teams; NOISE is Low if the percentage of a plant's output that requires rework is below the median, and is High otherwise.
TABLE 4 Robustness Tests
